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Abstract
The risk environment of fanners is changing. For example, price and production risks are in-
creasing and governments increasingly encourage agriculture to find private market solu-
tions for catastrophic risks like floods and epidemic diseases. We studied risk management
strategies like insurance - in which risks are shared with others - to find out whether such
strategies provide opportunities for fanners to deal with the new risks with which agriculture
is confronted. We concluded, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, that risk-sharing
strategies do provide such opportunities. From a theoretical perspective, because risk-shar-
ing tools are in principle advantageous to both individual fanners and society as a whole, and
from an empirical perspective, because fanners already perceive risk-sharing, especially in-
surance, as an important strategy to manage risks. The empirical results are based on a ques-
tionnaire survey among Dutch livestock fanners. Areas are identified for further research,
amongst other things, with respect to risk-sharing strategies for price risks and epidemic
livestock disease risks.
Keywords: risk sharing, risk pooling, asymmetric information, systemic risks, questionnaire
survey.
Introduction
Various types of risk can be distinguished. The classification of Hardaker et al.
(1997), who differentiated between business risks and financial risks, can be used
for most agricultural risks. Business risks include production risks, which are related
to the unpredictable nature of the weather and to the uncertain performance of crops
and livestock, and price risks, which refer to uncertainty ofprices of farm inputs and
outputs. Business risks furthermore include personal risks, like illness or death of
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people who operate the farm, and institutional risks, which originate from uncertain-
ty about the impact of government policies on farm profits. Financial risks refer to
the risks related to the way a farm is financed.
The risk environment of farmers is changing. This is caused partly by a changing
role of the government, i.e., less intervention on the one hand and more regulation on
the other (Zulauf et al., 1996; Ritson & Harvey, 1997; Harwood et al., 1999), and part-
ly by an increasing industrialization of agriculture (Boehlje & Lins, 1998). Examples
of the changed environment include increased price risks - at least for European farm-
ers currently producing under the price support programmes of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy - and increased production risks due to a more regulated use of medicines,
like restrictions on the use of antibiotics. Changes also occur in relation to risks of cat-
astrophic events like floods. In the past, farmers have often been compensated for such
losses by governments but now there is increasing pressure to find private-market so-
lutions. As a result of the industrialization of agriculture, farmers are increasingly ex-
posed to so-called contractual or relationship risks (Boehlje & Lins, 1998).
Taking more risks can increase a farmer's profit. However, like most people, farm-
ers are generally risk averse (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). To manage the risks they
face, farmers adopt a range of strategies including on-farm measures like diversifi-
cation or selecting less risky production methods, and strategies for sharing risks
with others. A well-known risk management strategy by which farmers can share
risks with others is to buy an insurance for specified risks (Rejda, 1998).
Given the changing risk environment, farmers need to find ways to cope with the
new risks they are confronted with. In this context we studied the pros and cons of
risk management strategies in which risks are shared with others. We did this from
both a theoretical perspective and an empirical one. The empirical results are based
on a questionnaire survey among Dutch livestock farmers.
Sharing risks
Principles ofrisk sharing
Risk sharing involves a contract in which risk is shared. This risk-sharing character-
istic distinguishes this type of contract from other forms of contract. In a rental con-
tract, like a lease contract, the farmer pays a rent to the lessor to use the resource, but
has to bear all the risks (Stiglitz, 1974). In a risk-shifting contract, like a fixed-for-
ward-price contract, the risk-shifter pays a kind of premium to the risk-taker and in
return receives a guaranteed price.
The sharing of risks is based on the concept ofpooling. The principle ofpooling is
that by combining independent losses in a pool, the expected total amount of losses
stays the same, but the variance of individual losses decreases (Harrington &
Niehaus, 1999). In addition, if the pool consists of large numbers of independent
risks, the relative variation in actual loss compared with the average loss further de-
creases (law of large numbers; Rejda, 1998) and the party that pools the risk is able
to predict average losses more accurately.
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Examples ofrisk-sharing strategies
Risk-sharing tools differ in the type of risk shared (e.g. price versus production risk),
the party with whom the risk is shared (e.g. a colleague farmer versus a contractor),
and whether the risk is shared directly or indirectly (e.g. production versus insurance
contract). Major forms of risk-sharing contracts include:
1. Share tenancy (also called share cropping or share lease). Share tenancy is a land
lease under which the rent paid by the tenant is a contracted percentage of the val-
ue of output per unit of time. As a rule, the landowner provides land and the tenant
provides labour; other inputs may be provided by either party (Cheung, 1969).
Nowadays, share tenancy is less widely used; it often has been replaced by the
wage system on the one hand and by full land rental contracts on the other
(Stiglitz, 1974). Reasons indicated by Stiglitz (1974) for this decline include the
development of capital markets (providing landlords and workers with other op-
portunities to diversify their portfolio), and the increasing capital intensity and
technological change in agriculture, implying a need for stronger incentives
(rental system) or stronger supervision (wage system).
2. Production contracts. Production contracts typically give the contractor consider-
able control over the production process. Contractors enter production contracts to
ensure timeliness and quality of commodity deliveries. A guaranteed market ac-
cess, ensured access to capital and lower variability of incomes are important rea-
sons for farmers to enter such contracts. Production contracts are widely used in
the broiler industry, and are becoming increasingly important in egg and hog in-
dustries (Harwood et al., 1999; Henessey & Lawrence, 1999).
3. Marketing contracts. Marketing contracts are agreements between a buyer and a
producer that set a price or outlet for a commodity before harvest or before the
commodity is ready to be marketed. The producer usually remains fully responsi-
ble for the management decisions during the production process. The most com-
monly used marketing contract is the fixed forward-price contract. With this type
of contract farmers can completely eliminate the price risk. Other forms of mar-
keting contracts share the price risk between the buyer and seller of the contract
(Harwood et al., 1999). Hedging on futures markets is rather similar to a fixed for-
ward-price contract, except for (i) futures contracts are standardized contracts that
are widely traded (i.e., prices are more competitively determined), and (ii) under a
futures contract, delivery of the commodity normally does not take place
(Hardaker et al., 1997).
4. Insurance. With insurance the insured typically pays a premium to the insurer and
receives an indemnity payment from the insurer once an insured loss occurs. The
insurer is the party that pools the risks, but risks are still shared among the in-
sured. This sharing of risks amongst insured manifests itself by additional premi-
um assessments or dividend payments at the end of the policy period, or by premi-
um adjustments at the beginning of the next policy period, all depending on the ac-
tualloss experience of the insurance pool (Rejda, 1998). Insurance is widely avail-
able for personal risks (e.g. life insurance) and for production risks like hail
(Hardaker et al., 1997).
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5. Financial leverage. Financial leverage is defined as the use of debt capital and oth-
er fixed-obligation financing relative to the use of equity capital (Robison &
Barry, 1987). Lenders pool the risk of loan defaults over many clients.
6. External equity financing. Equity investors receive a share of the returns of the
firm in which they invested equity (Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989). Investors
pool the risk of the firm making low or negative returns over a diversified portfo-
lio. Irwin et al. (1988) argue that investments in farm real estate are potentially at-
tractive to investors because the performance of such investments is not highly
correlated with the performance of a share market portfolio. However, the avail-
ability of equity financing in general production agriculture is limited because of,
amongst other things, the principal-agent problem and high monitoring costs
(Collins & Bourn, 1986; Lowenberg-DeBoer et al., 1989). Crane & Leatham
(1995) argue that there are opportunities for wider use of external equity financ-
ing in agriculture by means ofprofit- and loss-sharing contracts.
Asymmetric information
The larger the number of pooled independent risks, the more accurately the party
that pools the risks is able to predict the average losses and the amount of money
(e.g. an insurance premium) needed for dealing with these losses. However, asym-
metric information between risk-sharing parties - like between insurer and insured
or between lender and client - can lead to established premiums being insufficient to
cover the losses (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999).
Asymmetric information includes moral hazard and adverse selection. These
terms are explained here for insurance. In case of adverse selection, exposure units
most at risk buy more insurance than other units but the extent to which this happens
may not be known a priori to the insurer. With moral hazard, exposure units change
their behaviour in a manner not predicted by the insurer after having bought an in-
surance, for instance by becoming more careless (Arrow, 1996). Ways to reduce
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard include:
1. Underwriting. Before a risk-sharing contract is brought into effect, both parties try
to gain insight into each other's risk. In case of insurance, insurers generally im-
pose an obligation of disclosure in the insurance contract, requiring the insured to
inform them about any factors that can lead to above-normal risk; if the insured
fails to disclose relevant facts, the contract can be invalidated. Based on such in-
formation, insured are classified and premiums are differentiated for different
classes of risk (Rejda, 1998). Related to the use of debt capital, significant loan
losses in the USA in the 1980s have led to agricultural lenders increasingly em-
phasizing the credit quality and the management of the credit risk in their loan
portfolios. This has resulted in a growing use of risk-adjusted interest rates, differ-
ential loan limits, security requirements, and loan supervision requirements
(Miller et al., 1993). Such measures can result in considerable transaction costs
(Arrow, 1996).
2. Contract specifications. A risk-sharing contract can include 'rules of behaviour'.
For sharecropping, Stiglitz (1974) states that "a contract may not only specify the
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hours of labour to be provided, but also something about effort, degree of control,
and amount of supervision". Milgrom & Roberts (1992), in a more general con-
text, state that monitoring and verification are remedies against moral hazard. As
with underwriting, considerable costs can be involved.
3. Deductibles. With deductibles, the insured pay some specified amount of losses
themselves, which reduces fraud and encourages loss prevention (Rejda, 1998).
By using deductibles, the extent to which farmers can share risks is reduced. In
this respect Arrow (1992) argues that if without the use of such tools as de-
ductibles there would be a complete absence of risk shifting, it might be best to
use the tools and have at least some shifting of risk. Arrow (1992) regards insur-
ance as a risk-shifting tool. In this paper we consider insurance as a risk-sharing
tool with the insurer as intermediary. According to Vaughan & Vaughan (1996)
both definitions are useful. The first reflects the individual's perspective, the sec-
ond that of society.
4. Indemnification based on an objective, transparent index. Using an index reduces
adverse selection because information regarding an index is more generally avail-
able and more reliable. It reduces moral hazard, because an individual farmer can-
not influence the height of the index. It furthermore reduces transaction costs, be-
cause losses need not to be verified per individual. Indemnification based on an
index, however, only provides sufficient risk protection to individual farmers if an
index can be found that is highly correlated with farmers' loss experiences
(Miranda, 1991).
5. Local organizations. Risk-sharing pools that are locally oriented are likely to face
less severe problems of asymmetric information (i.e., lower costs of monitoring
and verification), because the risk-sharing parties have a more direct relationship
with each other (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). However, local pools have more dif-
ficulties in dealing with systemic risks (see e.g. Anderson & Hazell, 1994).
If problems of asymmetric information are severe and cannot be dealt with (at ac-
ceptable costs), sharing the risk becomes inefficient.
Systemic risks
The extent to which risks are stochastically independent is another important issue
when considering the pooling of risks. Pooling independent risks reduces the vari-
ance of losses. For example, if systemic (i.e., positively correlated) risks are pooled,
the variance of losses decreases less. By pooling completely systemic risks, variance
does not decrease at all (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). Risks that are completely
systemic, like prices and interest rates, can be efficiently dealt with on exchange
markets. The so-called 'in-between risks', i.e., risks that are neither completely inde-
pendent nor completely systemic (Skees & Barnett, 1999), are more problematical.
Examples include drought affecting crop yields over a large area and widespread
epidemics of livestock diseases. Organizations that pool such risks face higher costs
of pooling because of the need to hold substantial reserves in case systemic events
occur (Doherty, 1997).
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In order to prevent such increases in the cost of pooling, governments are often fi-
nancially involved in insurance schemes for 'in-between' risks. The Standard Rein-
surance Agreement for crop insurance in the USA is an example in which govern-
ments subsidize the insurance premiums as well as the administrative costs and the
reinsurance (Goodwin & Ker, 1998). In general it is argued that with events like
widespread floods or droughts such government involvement is more efficient than
ad hoc disaster assistance, but that it still involves inefficiencies (Barnett, 1999).
Skees & Barnett (1999) propose some, more market-based solutions to deal with
these inefficiencies. Furthermore, developments in capital markets, notably the in-
creasing 'securitization' of reinsurance, provide opportunities to reduce the need for
government involvement in insuring risks with systemic characteristics in the future
(Jaffee & Russell, 1997).
Introducing new risks
Risk-sharing contracts by themselves can lead to the introduction of new risks. With
reference to financial leverage, Hardaker et al. (1997) illustrate that an increase in
the financial leverage in financing a farm magnifies the impact on net income of
variability of farm returns.
New risks related to production contracts include the risk of contractors requiring
the upgrading of buildings and other infrastructure not expected by the farmer, and
the uncertainty about prolongation of a contract (Boehlje & Lins, 1998; Harwood et
al., 1999).
In relation to marketing contracts, farmers may not be able to fulfil the quality or
quantity requirements of a contract. Poor weather, for example, can lead to low
yields, forcing producers who contracted a large proportion of their crop to buy a
'replacement' crop at an uncertain cash price to meet the terms of delivery on their
forward contract (Quiggin & Anderson, 1979).
If the costs related to such new risks are larger than the benefits of using the strat-
egy, sharing the risks becomes inefficient.
What are the benefits of sharing risks?
For the farmer
It is generally assumed that farmers are risk averse, i.e., they are willing to pay a pre-
mium to reduce exposure to risk. If farmers can trade away part of the risks on their
farm at an acceptable cost, the expected utility for the farmer will increase (Arrow,
1996; Harrington & Niehaus, 1999).
Although sharing risks can increase the utility for the farmer, the latter is not like-
ly to share all risks. It is (largely) up to each individual farmer to decide which risks
and which part of these risks to share. Factors that can influence this decision in-
clude a farmer's degree of risk aversion, the costs involved in risk sharing, the rela-
tive size of a risk, the correlation of the risk with other risks, other sources of indem-
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nity, a farmer's perception of the nature of risk, and a farmer's income and wealth
(Barry et al., 1995; Hardaker et al., 1997; Harrington & Niehaus, 1999).
Also important for the farmer's decision about which risks to share and which
ones to bear is that this decision is part of the overall risk management problem he
faces when selecting a risk-efficient portfolio of on-farm and off-farm risky instru-
ments. Thus, for example, a decision about whether to insure against a particular
risk, and if so to what extent, cannot be properly made without reference to other
risky choices.
The above statements imply that there are no universal rules about which risks to
share and which ones not. Only in a few cases it is not completely up to the farmer
which risks are managed and by what type of strategies. For example, when a loan is
contracted, lenders could require that farmers use one or more risk management
strategies like crop insurance and forward contracting (Harwood et al., 1999).
For society
Sharing risks can also have a number of potential advantages for society as a whole.
1. If two individuals freely enter a contract, both of them must be better off, i.e.,
there must be an increase in utility for both. The sum of many such contracts
makes that society is better off, unless other individuals are injured in some way
(Arrow, 1992).
2. The possibility of sharing risks permits individuals to engage in risky activities,
which they otherwise would not undertake. That way, the expected return to soci-
ety is increased over what would prevail if individual agents were constrained to
accept only those risks they could afford to bear themselves (Arrow, 1992;
Hardakeretal., 1997; Rejda, 1998).
3. If farmers can trade away part of their risks so that they can move closer to the point
of expected profit maximization - but not fully because there are costs involved -
the result is a more socially desirable allocation of resources (Myers, 1988).
4. If farmers need to put less effort into on-farm methods of avoiding risks, they
might well be able to use their resources more efficiently, which in turn implies
greater overall efficiency in resource use (Hardaker et al., 1997; Rejda, 1998).
5. Trading away risks is likely to result in more stable farmers' incomes. More stable
incomes are likely to lead to more stable expenditures on farm inputs and family
consumption, thereby implying more stability for rural businesses with possible
flow-on benefits for society as a whole, for example through more rural employ-
ment. Moreover, it seems likely that more stable farm incomes contribute to the
viability of rural towns since there appears to be a degree of irreversibility in the
provision of retail and service activities in such communities. A downturn in farm
incomes and hence in spending by farm families leads to the closure of some local
businesses and to the withdrawal of government and commercially provided ser-
vices. Such lost facilities are seldom fully replaced when farmers' incomes later
recover (Hardaker et al., 1997).
6. More stable rural incomes for farmers (and other rural businesses) mean more re-
liable repayment of loans. This could be reflected in improved access to credit or
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lower borrowing costs, implying increased productive investment in the rural sec-
tor (Hazell, 1992; Hardaker et al., 1997).
7. If farmers are able to trade away (part of) the disastrous risks they face, the re-
silience (or sustainability) of farms increases, which can mean less human, animal
and environmental distress after the occurrence of disasters like severe floods or
droughts (Anderson & Hazell, 1994). This, however, is only true if moral hazard is
dealt with properly. Otherwise, farmers could, for example, pay less attention to
the prevention of disease outbreaks, leading to an increase in the number of disas-
ters occurring, or pay less attention to their stock during droughts, leading to more
instead of less animal distress.
It is interesting to note that Hardaker et al. (1997) raised the issues mentioned in
this section in a different context, in which they discuss why governments intervene
in agriculture.
Farmers' perceptions of risk and risk management: empirical results
To be able to better assess the possible role of risk-sharing tools for farmers in the
light of a changing risk environment, insight is needed into the 'current state of af-
fairs'. To this end, a survey of attitudes towards risk sharing of Dutch livestock farm-
ers was carried out.
In 1997 a mail questionnaire survey was carried out among 2700 Dutch livestock
farmers. The survey included questions about the socio-economic characteristics of
the farmers, and about their perceptions of the importance of various sources of risk
and risk management strategies including both on-farm strategies and strategies in
which risks are shared with others. Perceptions were measured on Likert-type scales
ranging from I (not relevant) to 5 (very relevant) (see e.g. Churchill, 1995).
Results presented here are based on 647 returned questionnaires. A total of 737
questionnaires were returned, but small farms « 20 NGE) and farms in which live-
stock accounted for less than one-third of the total NGE were excluded from the
analyses. (The abbreviation NGE is a Dutch standard for farm size (Anon., 1998). 20
NGE equals about one third of a full labour unit.) Of the 647 farms included in the
analyses, 376 farms (58%) were classified as cattle farms, of which over 99% were
dairy farms. Of the remaining farms, 170 (26%) were classified as pig farms, 20
(3%) as poultry farms, and 81 (13%) as mixed livestock farms.
Sources ofrisk
Twenty-two different sources of risk were considered. Table I groups the sources of
risk according to the classification of Hardaker et al. (1997). The table shows the
number of scores given per source of risk, the percentage distribution of respondents
over the categories I to 5, the average scores, and the overall rank. Averages and
rank are calculated per source of risk as well as per group. The averages per group
are weighted averages.
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Table I. Number of scores (n), percentage distribution of respondents over categories (I: not relevant, 5:
very relevant), average score and overall rank for the different sources of risk in the questionnaire sur-
vey.
Groups and related sources of risk n 1 2 3 4 5 Average Overall
----------------- % ---------------- score' rank
Price risks (4.14) (J)
Meat price 390 1 3 II 24 61 4.41 1
Milk price 433 3 2 10 27 58 4.34 3
Crop price 154 23 20 23 14 20 2.88 18
Personal risks (3.59) (2)
Death of fann operator 620 5 4 13 25 53 4.16 4
Health situation of farm family 629 3 5 23 34 35 3.92 6
Disability/health of farm operator2 633 6 10 24 30 30 3.70 8
Family relations (e.g. divorce) 615 13 7 19 5 36 3.65 9
Division of tasks within fann family 612 23 23 38 12 4 2.52 21
Institutional risks (3.50) (3)
Environmental policy 635 2 8 23 35 32 3.85 7
Animal welfare policy 631 5 12 26 34 23 3.57 10
Value of production rights 625 11 12 24 30 23 3.44 12/13
Elimination of government support 630 11 20 9 23 17 3.14 16
Production risks (3.37) (4)
Epidemic animal diseases 632 2 3 8 28 59 4.40 2
Technical results fattening animals 363 3 4 17 31 45 4.12 5
Consumer preferences} 618 6 12 29 36 17 3.47 11
Production costs 611 4 16 33 34 13 3.36 14
Milk yield 423 8 16 34 25 17 3.26 15
Non-epidemic animal diseases 625 8 20 39 24 9 3.07 17
Crop yields 165 25 22 21 16 16 2.76 19
Technology 574 32 27 29 10 2 2.22 22
Financial risks (3.02) (5)
Changes in interest rates 629 8 12 8 31 21 3.44 12/13
Ability to redeem loans 619 28 22 23 16 11 2.60 20
I The average scores (in parentheses) for groups of risks are weighted averages.
2 Including farm workers.
}Factor analysis carried out by Meuwissen et al. (2001) showed that this source of risk could be as-
signed to the risk factor 'production'.
Of the five categories of risk distinguished, price risks were perceived as most im-
portant (Table I). Financial risks were least important. Considering the 22 sources of
risk separately, Table I shows that, besides meat and milk price, 'epidemic animal
diseases' and 'death of farm operator' were also perceived as important. In the cate-
gories of 'institutional risks' and 'financial risks' none of the included sources was
perceived as really important. Note, however, the large dispersion of answers given
for sources like 'value of production rights' and 'ability to redeem loans'. The high
score for' epidemic animal diseases' is likely to be positively influenced by the large
epidemic of Classical Swine Fever at the time the survey was held. Also the cases of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) at that time could have affected the
score, although BSE is not an epidemic disease.
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Table 2. Number of scores (n), percentage distribution of respondents over categories (1: not relevant, 5:
very relevant), average score, and overall rank for the different risk management strategies in the ques-
tionnaire survey.
Groups and related strategies n I 2 3 4 5 Average Overall
----------------- % ---------------- score l rank
Risk-sharing strategies (3.16) (1)
Buying business insurance 576 2 2 11 31 54 4.34 2
Buying personal insurance 571 4 4 18 29 45 4.06 3
Price contracts for farm outputs 457 36 13 17 18 16 2.65 6
Price contracts for farm inputs 464 37 14 17 19 13 2.58 7
The use of futures markets 445 69 12 13 4 2 1.58 12
On-farm strategies (2.47) (2)
Producing at lowest possible costs 591 0 0 4 23 73 4.66 1
Applying strict hygienic rules 578 2 4 25 31 37 3.97 4
Increase solvency ratio 522 10 7 33 27 23 3.44 5
Spatial diversification 509 49 14 17 12 8 2.16 8
Off·farm investment 514 44 20 21 10 5 2.14 9
Enterprise diversification 514 50 16 18 9 7 2.06 10
Off-farm employment 506 54 16 17 8 5 1.96 11
I The average scores (in parentheses) for groups of risk management strategies are weighted averages.
Risk management strategies
In the questionnaire survey 12 risk management strategies were considered. Table 2
presents an overview of the strategies, grouped into 'strategies in which risks are
shared with others' and 'on-farm risk management strategies'. The number of scores
given, the percentage distribution of answers over the categories I to 5, the average
score, and the overall rank are shown per strategy.
In general, risk-sharing strategies were perceived as more important risk manage-
ment strategies than on-farm strategies (Table 2). On a per strategy basis, producing
at lowest possible costs, and buying business and personal insurance (in this order)
were perceived as most important. Although on average, price risks were perceived
as the major source of risk (Table I), risk-sharing strategies to deal with price risks
were not perceived as important. Nevertheless, answers given for price contracts
show a relatively high variation. The use of futures markets was perceived as the
least important risk management strategy.
The answers given for risk-sharing strategies were studied in more detail. Tests for
statistically significant differences (P ~ 0.05) were carried out for farmers with dif-
ferent age, education, gross farm income, type of farm (cattle, pig, poultry, mixed),
form of ownership (sale proprietorship; partnership between husband and wife; be-
tween brother and sister; between children and parents; combination of children,
husband/wife, and parents), availability of successor (distinguished categories in-
cluded: yes, no, don't know), and farm size.
Differences were tested with non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H tests (Conover,
1980). Linear regression was used only for farm size; farm size was the only metric
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variable. Variables such as number of cows and hectares were all transformed into
NGEs. By using regression it is assumed that standard parametric procedures are ap-
propriate for independent variables that are in the form of Likert-type scales (see al-
so Patrick & Musser, 1997).
Statistically significant differences were found for farm type and form of owner-
ship. Pair-wise comparisons between different farm types and forms of ownership
were carried out with Mann-Whitney V-tests (Conover, 1980). Because of the multi-
ple testing of the data, the significance level was adjusted by using the Bonferroni
test (Winer et al., 1991). This implies that the significance level was divided by the
number of categories distinguished, resulting in a significance level of P ::; 0.0125
(0.05/4) for farm types, and ofP::; 0.01 (0.05/5) for form of ownership.
Price contracts for farm inputs and for farm outputs were deemed more important
by respondents from poultry farms than by respondents from the other types of farm.
Price contracts for farm outputs were perceived as more important by respondents
from pig and mixed farms than by those from cattle farms.
Respondents from farms with sole proprietorship and farms owned by parents and
children perceived buying business insurance as less important than respondents
from farms with an ownership consisting of some combination of children, hus-
band/wife, and parents.
Linear regression was also used to test whether the respondents who perceived a
particular type of risk as more important also assigned more importance to strategies
to manage this risk. Such relationships were tested for the perception of price risks
and price-risk management strategies, the perception of personal risks and personal
insurance, and the perception of production risks and business insurance. (Institution-
al and financial risks showed no logical relationships with any of the risk-sharing
strategies in the survey.) For price risks, no statistically significant (P ::; 0.05) rela-
tionships were found. For the personal risks 'death of farm operator', 'health situation
of farm family', and 'family relations' a direct relationship was found with the per-
ceived importance of personal insurance. For the production risks and business insur-
ance, such a relationship was found for 'epidemic animal diseases' and 'milk yield'.
Conclusions and future outlook
In a context of changing risk environment for farmers, the objective of this paper
was to review the pros and cons of risk-sharing strategies. It can be concluded, on
both theoretical and empirical grounds, that risk-sharing strategies provide opportu-
nities for dealing with the new (and the old) risks with which agriculture is confront-
ed. Theoretically, risk-sharing tools are in principle advantageous to both individual
farmers and society as a whole. Empirically, farmers already perceive risk-sharing
strategies (especially insurance) as important strategies to manage risks.
Future outlook
From this study the following areas for further research in the field of risk-sharing
strategies became apparent:
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1. From the literature it is clear that arrangements such as production contracts are
growing increasingly important because they ensure farmers' access to capital.
However, the use of production contracts also involves some risks, such as unex-
pected requirements imposed on contractors. Further research into various forms
of external equity financing for farmers (without the risk mentioned for produc-
tion contracts) seems worthwhile, especially given the increasing industrialization
of agriculture.
2. The empirical results indicate that factors like farm type and form of ownership
influence farmers' perceptions of risk-sharing strategies. Further research on such
factors would be useful for developers and sellers of risk-sharing strategies in or-
der to better tune their products, services and marketing strategies.
3. Empirical results show that there is a mismatch between farmers' perceptions of
price risks and the perceived importance of risk management strategies to deal
with price risks. In particular, futures markets were not perceived as relevant. Re-
search is needed to clarify whether there is a lack of understanding by farmers of
currently available strategies like futures trading, or whether current products for
risk sharing do not fulfil farmers' needs. In the first case there is a need for educa-
tion. In the second case current products need to be adapted or new products de-
veloped. Given the indicated importance of insurance schemes, insurers may be
able to develop and successfully introduce schemes that cover price risks.
4. The livestock farmers in the sample assigned a high priority to epidemic animal
disease risks. Combined with the direct relationship that was found for the per-
ceived importance of this risk and the perceived importance of business insurance,
this seems to point at a need for insurers to develop and promote new products in
this area. Promotion is especially important because epidemic animal disease risks
are 'low-probability-high-consequence risks'. People generally underestimate
such risks and have difficulties in recalling them. With respect to both price risks
and epidemic disease risks, research is needed to examine issues of asymmetric
information and the systemic character of these risks.
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